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INCENTIVES TO ADVERTISE: TOO STRONG,
TOO WEAK, OR JUST RIGHT?
Lynn Hunnicutt and L. Dwight Israelsen

ABSTRACT

There is some debate about whether firms advertise too much or too little. We present a
simple model to examine the incentives of a firm to advertise, and distinguish between the market
expansion effects and business stealing effects of advertising. When products are homogeneous,
firms advertise too little relative to the amount that would maximize total industry profits. In
differentiated products markets, the possibility of stealing customers from competitors causes firms
to advertise too much. Finally, we derive conditions that determine when an expansion in one firm's
advertising level increases rival advertising.

INCENTIVES TO ADVERTISE: TOO STRONG
TOO WEAK, OR JUST RIGHT?*

INTRODUCTION
There is some debate about whether consumers face too much or too little advertising. Bagwell and
Ramey (1994) find that there may be too little advertising in equilibrium, if ads serve to coordinate buyers
and sellers. Nelson (1974) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) claim that since advertising itself signals
product quality (irrespective of content), there may be too little advertising in equilibrium. Benham (1972)
finds that advertising that is informative increases competition and reduces prices paid by consumers. On
the other hand, Tremblay and Tremblay (1995) point out that there may be more advertising than is optimal,
especially if advertising is costly, uninformative, or used to sell consumers things they do not need. Dixit
and Norman (1978), and comments by Fisher and McGowan (1979) and Shapiro (1980), show that if
advertising does not enlarge the size of the market, it reduces social welfare.
In this paper, we modify a model first applied to worker decisions in collectives and communes to
examine the incentives to advertise. In the model, advertising may increase demand for all products in the
industry (the market size effect), and/or it may reallocate demand from one firm to another (the business
stealing effect). The market size effect represents an externality created by the advertising firm for all
competitors in the industry. When business stealing is not possible, the competitive equilibrium level of
advertising is smaller than that which would maximize industry profits. If firms can reallocate sales toward
themselves by increasing their advertising, incentives to advertise are too strong, and the competitive
equilibrium number of ads is larger than that which would maximize industry profits. Next we look at the
effect of firm i's advertising on firm j' s incentive to advertise, and find that if the business stealing effect
is not present, advertisements are strategic substitutes. Increased advertisements by firm j reduce the
marginal profits from an additional ad by firm i reducing the equilibrium level of advertising for firm i. In
industries where the business stealing effect is present, the effect is more complicated. In fact, the results
may be reversed. That is, ads may be strategic complements, so that increased advertising by firm j may
increase firm i's incentive to advertise.
THE MODEL
This model is related to that presented in Israelsen (1980), which was applied to work incentives
In collectives and communes. Each firm's profit is given 1t j = sjF(A, X) - c(a j), where Sj is the firm's

share of industry revenue F(-) , which depends on total industry advertising (A) and other industry inputs
(X). Profits are reduced by the cost of the firm ' s advertising. The firm's share of industry revenue (Sj)
depends on the structure of the industry, as we will see below.
When products are homogeneous, each firm takes its share of the market as given, so that its
profits depend only on the number of firms in the industry. In particular, when products cannot be
differentiated, advertising done by anyone firm does not affect its share of market revenue. These are the
"competitive" industries of economics textbooks, where products are not differentiated, and advertising for
product i does not differentiate it from others in consumers ' minds. In this case, the firm's profit function
is
h
J[

I

I
= - F( A,X) -c(a[.) .

n

For simplicity, assume that the n firms in the industry are identical, so that each of them gets an
equal share of industry revenue. To ensure a finite level of advertising, we assume

.F} >0, FJ 1~O,

and

c'(-»O , so that advertising raises revenue but at a decreasing rate. In this market, firm i's revenue depends

on total industry advertising and the number of competitors in the industry.
A second type of industry is one where products are differentiated, so that advertising for product i
causes consumers to believe that the good is distinct. In this case, the firm's revenue function is given by
d
J[i

ai

=A

F(A,X)-c(ai) .

In this industry, advertising has two effects. First, when firm i increases its share of industry
advertising, it is able to attract customers that formerly went to competitors. This business stealing exists

when

~(ai)=~(l_
ai dA J~o .
dai A
A
A dai

The second effect of advertising is the market expansion effect. This

occurs when firm i's advertising increases total industry advertising and thus attracts new consumers to the
industry. All firms in the industry benefit from a positive market expansion effect, which occurs when

dA >0.
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If ads by firm i are offset by fewer industry ads, then firm i' s revenues rise only because it is stealing some
of the industry's existing customers from its rivals (without increasing the number of customers purchasing
in the industry). Also note that the larger firm i's share of industry advertising

(~),

the smaller the

response of industry ads to increases in i's advertisements must be in order for i to steal business from its
competitors. Firms that already do most of an industry's advertising have a hard time stealing business
from their rivals through additional advertisements .
In a differentiated goods industry, firm i's revenue depends both on total industry advertising, and
on its share of that total. Many consumer goods companies face revenue functions like this one. For
example, internet booksellers may benefit when amazon.com increases its television advertising (i.e., A
increases). They are also likely to benefit if their own television advertisements (aj) attract customers to
their website.
Notice that in homogeneous and differential industries, total revenue earned by firms is given by
TI=(A ,X )-Ie(ai) .

'
' I'les -8F=L.,'
" - de da/'. Th
A t the .In dustryoptImum,
-dO = 0 w h'IC h Imp
at 'IS, th
e 'Increase in industry
dA

'

8A

I

dai dA

revenue caused by an additional industry adve11isement must equal the total marginal cost of ads. In the
private solution, dJri =0 , which might lead to over- or underinvestment in advertising.
dai

INCENTIVES TO ADVERTISE
To determine the effect of an increase in i's advertising on its own profit, we use the following
first-order condition

2

3

h
dJr i = ~ 8F ~ _ ~
da j n 8A dai daj'

Firm i maximizes its profits by setting dJrj =0 , which implies that it advertises until the marginal
dai

de
cost of its own advertising
is equal to its share of incremental industry profit from advertising
daj
18F

dA
From the industry's point of view, assuming that advertisements are independently chosen, so that

(dA = IJ, firm [.' S ads should be set to satisfy
.
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first-order condition at the privately optimal level of adveliisin g, we have
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Thus, in the homogeneous goods ind ustry, firm i advertises too little. That is, private incentives to
advertise are too low in homogeneous goods industri es.
In the differentiated product industry, the competitive equilibrium solves each firm ' s first-order
condition as follows :

Here, we have both the market expansion and the business stealing effects of advertising. Recall
that the market expansion effect is given by
advertising

(dA
~oJ .
daj

~,
daj

which is positive as long as firm i' s ads increase industry

In the homogeneous goods equilibrium, the industry benefit of the last advertisement

8F was n times larger than its cost. Here, th e indu stry benefit to firm i's last advertisement may not be n
8A

times larger than its cost, since firm i's adve rtise ments may steal customers from its rivals, which neither
benefits nor harms the industry as a whol e.
The second effect present in th e di fferentiated products model is the business stealing effect, given
d aj . As Iong as 1-aj dA
aj dA
'
fr om Its
. nva
. Is w h en It
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.
- >0 , or - < 1 , fimTI l. stea ls b
usmess
by daj A

A da j

A daj

own advertising.
In the differentiated goods industry, each firm sets the marginal cost of an additional
advertisement equal to its marginal gain. Thus, evaluating the industry first-order condition at the
competitive equilibrium level of advertisements, and recalling that our independence assumption

dA

guarantees that -d

aj

= 1,

we see that
dTI
daj

=(1 - ai ) (8F _f...) sO .
A

8A

A

In differential products industries, dD sO since our assumptions about the shape of F(A, X)
dai

guarantee that (8F
8A

_f...)
< O.
A

In contrast to the homo geneous goods industry, the ability of firms to steal

business from competitors gives firms a larger incenti ve to advertise than is optimal for the mdustry as a
whole . When firms can steal customers from one anoth er, each of them advertises too much.

4

EFFECTS OF COMPETITOR'S ADS
Next, we examine the effect of an increase in flrm i's advertising on flrml's proflts, and thus on

;t .

2

flrml's incentive to advertise. To examine this issue, we calculate dd

at aj

~=
dat

By using our assumption that

1 , and the fIrst-order condition, we see that in the homogeneous goods industry
2
d
daida j

;r;

2
2
1 [a F aF d A]
= -;;; aA2 + aA dai da j

2
1a F
= -;;; a 2 A :::; 0 .

Thus, an increase in firm l's advertising reduces the marginal profltability of flrm i's
advertisements. This discourages firm i from advertising, wh ich reinforces our conclusion that there is too
little advertising in a homogeneous goods industry. In homogeneous goods industries, since the only effect
of advertising is to expand the market (benefiting all firms in the industry), advertisements are guaranteed
to be strategic substitutes. Increased advertising by a rival reduces the marginal beneflt of advertising,
without changing its cost.
In differentiated products industries, the effects are more complex, because advertising not only
increases the size of the market, it also allows flrms to steal business from one another. Here, assuming
dA

that -

dai

=

1 , we see that

;rf = ~ [F(A, X) (1- ai )+ aF(A, X) at] = ~{aF _ F}(l_ 2ai ) + ai a

2
d
datda j
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A

A
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A
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This term is more difficult to sign and may in fact be positive.
.

negative. The third part

2

a~ a ~

A

M

A

2

F .
A aA 2

The flrst part

~{~ -5}

is

2a i
is also negative. Since we cannot sign 1- - - , we are left with no clear

A

conclusions regarding how an increase in advertising by firm j will affect flrm i's marginal profltability of
advertising.

CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the incentives of a firm to advertise in both homogeneous and
differentiated products industries. Advertising has two effects-it may expand the market, thus increasing
the welfare of all flrms in the industry, and it may induce customers of one flrm to purchase from a
competing fIrm instead. This business stealing effect is present only when products are differentiated. We
show that when business stealing is not possible, individual flrm incentives to advertise are too low, and
fewer ads than would maximize industry proflt are produced. This suggests why many agricultural
industries include cooperatives and checkoff programs designed to expand the market. In differentiated
products industries, the possibility of stealing customers from a rival increases the incentive of the flrm to
advertise, making the privately optimal level of advertising too large.
Next, we look at the effect an increase in flrm l's advertising levels have on flrm i's optimal
choice of advertising. In homogeneous goods industries, we flnd that an increase in flrm l's advertising
level reduces the marginal beneflts to firm i of advertising, so that flrm i advertises less. That is, in
homogeneous goods industries, ads are strategic substitutes. In differentiated goods industries, the effect is
more complicated, and clear results are more difficult to obtain. It is possible that an increase in fIrm l's
advertising level might increase fIrm i' s desired advertising, making advertisements strategic complements.
This paper does not make claims regarding socially optimal levels of advertising, because we have
not considered consumer welfare. In both types of industries, the privately optimal level of advertising is
not likely to maximize social welfare, as it does not even maximize industry-wide proflts. Further results
are difficult to obtain without examining the effects of advertisements on consumer utility.

Extensions of this work include looking at the effect of increased industry advertisements on
individual firm incentives to advertise. Especially in homogeneous goods industries, where private
advertisements need to be supplemented by industry group advertising levels, it would be useful to
characterize the effects of a rise in A on the optimal level of a;. It would also be useful to examine the
effect of mergers on incentives to advertise . When two firms merge, their share of industry advertising will
(at least initially) rise. Depending on what one assumes about how final shares adjust, one may see larger
or smaller incentives to advertise, which may increase or reduce social welfare.
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